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Unifying the debates: mathematical and non-causal explanations 
 
In the last couple of years a few seemingly independent debates on 
scientific explanation have emerged, with several key questions that take 
different forms in different areas. For example, the question what makes an 
explanation distinctly mathematical and are there any non-causal explanations 
in sciences (i.e. explanations that don’t cite causes in the explanans) 
sometimes take a form of the question what makes mathematical models 
explanatory, especially whether highly idealized models in science can be 
explanatory and in virtue of what they are explanatory. These questions raise 
further issues about counterfactuals, modality and explanatory asymmetries, 
i.e. do mathematical and non-causal explanations support counterfactuals, and 
how to understand explanatory asymmetries in non-causal explanations. Even 
though these are very common issues in the philosophy of physics and 
mathematics, they can be found in different guises in the philosophy of 
biology, where there is the statistical interpretation of the Modern Synthesis 
theory of evolution, according to which the post-Darwinian theory of natural 
selection explains evolutionary change by citing statistical properties of 
populations and not the causes of changes. These questions also arise in 
philosophy of ecology or neuroscience in regard to the nature of topological 
explanations. The question here is whether in network models in biology, 
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ecology, neuroscience and computer science the mathematical or more 
precisely topological properties can be explanatory of physical phenomena, or 
they are just different ways to represent causal structures. 
 
The aim of the special issue is to unify all these debates around several 
overlapping questions. 
 These questions are: are there genuinely or distinctively mathematical and 
non-causal explanations, are all distinctively mathematical explanations also 
non-causal, in virtue of what are they explanatory, does the instantiation, 
implementation or in general, does applicability of mathematical structures to 
variety of phenomena and systems play any explanatory role, what makes 
them universally applicable, is it the genericity in which generic and 
rudimentary features of particular types of mathematical explanations (such as 
topological) that make them universally applicable, or is it because they 
explain by providing an understanding of mathematical structure 
independently from being instantiated in any particular system, or if they can 
be explanatory only when the details of instantiation are provided, is it then 
some ontological fact that makes them universally applicable to a variety of 
very diverse phenomena, e.g. is there some fundamental physical fact in virtue 
of which many real-world systems exhibit or instantiate certain topologies? 
The special issue provides a platform for unifying the debates around 
several key issues and thus open up avenues for better understanding of 
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mathematical and non-causal explanations in general, but also, it will enable 
even better understanding of key issues within each of the debates.  
The topic of mathematical and non-causal explanations is increasingly 
being discussed in the last couple of years (Batterman and Rice 2014; 
Bokulich 2008; Chirimuuta 2017; Huneman 2010, 2015; Kostic 2016a,b; 
Lange 2013, 2016; Reutlinger and Andersen 2016; Reutlinger 2017 a,b; Saatsi 
and Pexton 2013; Saatsi and Jansson 2016). The growing literature on 
mathematical and non-causal explanations enquires into the general features of 
these explanations and their relation to some of the well understood accounts 
of causal explanation, such as the mechanistic one (Machamer et al 2000; 
Craver 2007; Craver and Darden 2013), deductive-nomological (Hempel and 
Oppenheim 1948) or semantic one (Chalmers and Jackson 2001).  
However, not enough attention is devoted to the specific accounts of non-
causal and mathematical explanations in their own right, without comparative 
perspective to causal explanations, and even more importantly, the lack of 
discussions about the epistemic norms that specific scientific problems or 
areas of science impose on the structure of explanation becomes increasingly 
apparent.  
The contributions in this special issue respond to these challenges in a very 
systematic and direct way.  
In his contribution to this special issue, Bob Batterman argues that the 
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notion of universality has been misunderstood in the recent philosophical 
literature. He argues that to explain how a phenomenon is universal requires 
recognizing that that universality implies a kind of stability of behavior under 
perturbation. Furthermore, he argues that this stability itself requires 
explanation.  He discusses how the renormalization group can provide the 
relevant explanation.  The explanation of the stability characteristic of 
universality is then related to the autonomy of certain models or theories at 
continuum scales from those at scales of molecules or atoms. 
Marc Lange in his contribution discusses the basis on which an 
explanation of a given phenomenon can be deemed causal or non-causal. 
When we use one rather than the other type of explanation to explain a 
phenomenon, we immediately face the question of whether the one we decided 
not to use is less explanatory, whether the two explain the same facts, and to 
what extent they are competitors or complementary. Lange discuses two 
explanations of rocket acceleration, one (which uses forces) that he deems 
causal-mechanical and the other (which uses conservation laws) that he deems 
non-causal. Lange argues that the causal explanation explains facts that the 
conservation-law explanation can’t, but also that the conservation-law 
explanation explains facts that the causal explanation can't. Thus, they are not 
competitors. Furthermore, the conservation-law explanation has some virtues 
that the causal one lacks. For instance, the conservation-law explanation 
unifies various different propulsion mechanisms in that it would still have held 
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even if the rocket's propulsion mechanisms had been replaced. Moreover, it 
would still have held even if some of the laws governing molecular collisions 
had been radically different and so even if the causal explanation had been 
different.  
  Daniel Kostic argues that there are various trade-offs among the 
complexity in the structure of explanation, scientific understanding and 
explanatory depth. The idea is that the level of complexity in the structure of 
explanation is inversely proportional to the level of intimacy between 
explanation and understanding, i.e. the more complexity the less intimacy. 
This further affects the explanatory depth, i.e. the less complexity the greater 
explanatory depth and vice versa. His account provides a framework for 
making sense of various levels of intimacy between the explanation and 
understanding, from the ones in which explanation and understanding are the 
most distinct, i.e. where there can’t be understanding without explanation 
(Khalifa 2012, 2017; Strevens 2008, 2013) to cases where the explanation has 
a minimal structure and it seems that scientific understanding is obtained 
without explanation (Lipton 2009). This is a gradual view of explanation, 
according to which the less of the structure it has the more of the 
understanding it provides, and vice versa. Thus, he concludes that the 
topological explanations and some other types of non-causal explanations 
indeed have a minimal structure in virtue of which they provide greater 
understanding and explanatory depth.  
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In his contribution Hugh Desmond argues that it is puzzling why 
redescribing a phenomenon with different level of detail should make a 
difference between whether causal or non-causal explanations are favored. 
Desmond argues that this particular situation creates a serious problem for the 
ontic approach to causal and non-causal explanations, and instead he proposes 
a pragmatic-modal account, which accounts for the relation between 
granularity and the causal nature of explanation in terms of how contextual 
factors affect the modal structure of an explanation. Desmond’s account has 
the additional advantage of dissolving some important disagreements 
concerning the status of non-causal explanations issues. 
In his contribution Luca Rivelli revisits Stuart Kaufman’s idea about 
the ensemble explanations. Luca argues that in the complex systems and 
evolutionary theory there is a hierarchy of non-mechanistic,	 non-causal	explanations	which	form	an	explanatory	chain	in	the	hierarchy	of	levels	of	explanations,	 where	 explanantia	 at	 the	 higher	 level	 are	 recursively	explained	 at	 the	 lower	 level.	 Such	 hierarchical	 ensemble	 as	 a	 whole	 is	grounded	 in	 some	 kind	 of	 a	 mechanistic	 explanation.	 The	 ensemble	account	 of	 explanation	 has	 two	 very	 important	 features,	 they	 provide	 a	framework	for	understanding	the	multilevel	mechanistic	explanations	of	certain	aspects	of	weak	emergence	and	they	also	provide	a	framework	for	thinking	about	the	explanatory	unification	of	non-causal	explanations.		
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Finally, Philippe Huneman argues that the post-genomic turn in 
evolutionary biology does lead to a greater diversity of explanations, including 
some of the recently introduced cases of non-causal and mathematical 
explanations, such as topological explanations and statistical explanations. 
Huneman argues that the shift in understanding the concepts of genes, 
variation and inheritance in the postgenomic science provides topological and 
statistical explanatory frameworks which focus on genomic networks of many 
sorts and nucleotide-focused statistical tools respectively. These new 
explanatory practices are difficult to translate into mechanistic frameworks of 
explanation. Thus, according to him, this situation indicates diversification of 
explanatory frameworks in the postgenomic science and evolutionary biology, 
which should be a welcome shift.  
The contributions in this special issue paint a clearer picture about the 
relation between mathematical and non-causal explanations. Not all 
mathematical explanations are equally non-causal, there are degrees of being 
non-causal which are reflected in the level of explanatoriness, unification, 
modal strength and explanatory depth. For example, explanations of 
universality, and minimal structure explanations seem to be further on the 
spectrum of being non-causal, and they seem to provide greater unification, 
whereas statistical explanations, pragmatic-modal explanations and ensemble 
explanations work better when they are supplemented or combined with some 
kind of causal/mechanical explanations. This further implies that the level of 
unification, modal strength and explanatory depth are mutually dependent 
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concepts which follow the degrees of being non-causal, i.e. the more non-
causal the explanation is, the more unification, modal strength and explanatory 
depth it provides.    
The literature on mathematical and non-causal explanations continues 
to grow and diversify, that is why it requires an assessment from the unifying 
perspective. That is why this special issue aims at discussing the broad and 
converging set of ideas about mathematical and non-causal explanations, that 
only recently started to emerge.  
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